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ABSTRACT 
The US government has adopted an affordable housing goal and under this goal 
Government sponsored enterprises hav e increased their presence in certain  
targeted areas which are primarily low income gro ups. This increased activity 
should increase credit supply and ideally should improve the housing market 
conditions for these groups . Unfortunately,  this has not been the case and this 
paper aims to resolve this paradox . As GSE activit ies increase in certa in areas by 
targeting lower income groups, they eat  into FHA’s market share .  With this 
expansion the GSE targets the higher income group for FHA loans. In response 
the FHA applies more strict  underwrit ing standards and as a result ,  in the new 
market equilibrium, the FHA loan proportion reduces. So overall , the credit  
supply and homeownership does not change.  Additionally, the paper also intends 
to check if an increased GSE activity has affected the delinquency rates of other 
government loan programs, namely the FHA.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines a seeming paradox in the area of mortgage originations  and 
affordable housing goals , which has not been studied in great  detail in academic 
literature.  We extend previous research by investigating the impact of  
involvement of Government Sponsored Entity (GSE) in achieving affordable 
housing goals on the Federal Housing Administration  (FHA) activity,  using this 
historical  data to demonstrate that  the involvement of GSE increases FHA 
foreclosure rate trends in the following years.  
In order to facil itate credit access and home-ownership among lower-income and 
minority households, the Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and 
Soundness Act of 1992 (GSE Act) empowered the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) to establish targets for Fannie Mae and Fredd ie 
Mac (together called government sponsored entities,  GSEs) purchases of 
mortgages originated to these groups. These affordable housing goals have led the 
GSEs to increase their activity to the targeted groups  (Listokin and Wyly, 2000) 
however, evidence has not established a direct impact of the goals and GSE 
purchase activities on credit  access and homeowne rship (Ambrose and Thibodeau, 
2004; Bostic and Gabriel,  2004).  
 
This paper attempts to replicate the seeming following paradox from the paper 
(An and Bostic, 2006):  Although GSE activities in targeted groups have increased , 
but there has been l ittle measurable improvement in credit access and housing 
affordability goals in these groups.  This paper presents the conclusions in 2  
unique dimensions:  
1.)  The more aggressive GSE pursuit of targeted borrowers, induced potential 
FHA borrowers to use conventional loans instead, in response the  FHA loan 
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volumes reduced. Is there evidence to support that an increased GSE 
activity reduces FHA feedback?  
 
2.)  We have extended our research in point 1 above by i nvestigating whether 
an increase in the GSE loan activity increases the foreclosure rates for the 
FHA loans.  Such a relationship has not been previously examined in 
academic literature and we attempt to provide ou r analysis on this feature .  
 
Using a simple model of credit  rationing, we establish that  the GSE activities can 
have a feedback effect on FHA: in response to the more aggressive lending 
pursuits of GSE, FHA applies more strict underwriting standards under a new 
market equilibrium which results in reduced loan volumes. The overall ef fects 
offset each other and leave the credit supply and home ownership effectively 
unchanged. We test this model by analysing whether intensified GSE purchases 
are associated with a reduction in FHA activities in 50  states  and D.C. and find 
that  such a relationship exists,  in support  of the theory.  
 
The research is focussed on allowing for new insights regarding the relationships 
between different segments of the mortgage market and how these relationships  
change as institutional settings evolve. The findings from this paper can be used 
to scrutinize whether the current affordable housing goals are appropriate and 
whether new incentives should be provided to th e GSEs to extend its  services to  
the underserved communities.   
 
The research paper is divided into sections,  the next section gives a brief 
background of GSE and FHA loans and their respective roles in the US housing 
market crisis.  Section 3 briefly reviews the policy context and existing studies 
related to the current research. Section 4 develops a simple theoretical model 
based on credit rationing theory. Sectio n 5 and 6 discuss the data report the 
empirical  approach and findings. Conclusions and remarks are in section 7.  
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1.1 Background 
U.S. housing policy has long promoted homeownership for American households.  
Major federal  housing programs with this goal include:  
 
1.)  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
with a public mission to support the U.S. mortgage market and private 
incentives to maximize profits and shareholder value. The GSEs had 
outstanding obligations (debt and mortgage backed security (MBS) 
guarantees) of over $5.5 trillion at  9/30/2008, just  after being pla ced in a 
government conservatorship.  Their public mission also includes “housing 
goals” that provide motivation for the GSEs to support the mortgage market 
for lower income households and regions.  The GSEs today are traded on the 
stock exchange and are  entities with an explicit guarantee of payment.  
 
2.)  The Federal  Housing Administration (FHA), created in 1934, operates as 
an independent entity within the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
agency to insure home mortgages for lower income households. The FHA 
is normally self-supporting, setting its insurance fees to cover its expected 
losses. It has been highly successful over its history and has never required 
a government subsidy or bailout for its single -family mortgage insurance 
program. However,  i t  is  facing escalating losses in the aftermath of the 
mortgage crisis.  
 
Role of FHA in the US housing market  
 
The FHA is not a mortgage lender.  Instead, its  primary role is to insure 
mortgages FHA-approved lenders provide home buyers. One to four -unit 
residential  properties, manufactured homes and hospitals are all included 
in the FHA program.  
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As of 2012, the FHA had insured more than 34 million properties, making 
it the world's largest mortgage insurer. FHA loans generally serve as an 
alternative for borrowers unable to meet the 20 percent down payment and 
other requirements of conventional lenders.  FHA loans typically require a 
3.5 percent down payment minimum and have looser credit restrictions.   
 
The FHA mortgage process works because i t benefits  all  parties involved. 
Borrowers have access to financing otherwise not available.  FHA -approved 
lenders can take on more risky borrowers with less down payment because 
the crux of the program is the FHA mortgage insurance premiums buyers 
pay. Premiums usually include about 1 percent of the loan value upfront 
and 1 to 2 percent of the loan balance annually paid through m onthly 
installments. This is  what allows the FHA to insure lenders against loss 
from non-paying borrowers.  The housing market and economy benefit  as 
well because of the increased volume of available home buyers.  
 
The Role of GSEs in US housing market  
 
One major responsibility of GSEs is to promote access to mortgage credit  
throughout the United States.  The others include providing stability in the 
secondary market for residential mortgages, responding to private capital markets, 
increasing liquidity of the  mortgage investments and improving the distribution 
of capital  available for mortgage finance.  
 
The GSEs buy the mortgages that are issued by the banks and securitize them by 
creating mortgage backed securities. These mortgage backed securities are then 
sold off to outside investors with a guarantee of full payment of principal and 
interest.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are private institutions owned by 
stockholders.  
Though these are institutions that trade on the stock market , they have in exchange 
for regulatory oversight accepted an implicit government guarantee of support. 
5 
 
As a result  of this guarantee they get access to cheap credit  from the market. As 
these GSEs work closely with lenders, they can free up tied capital  thereby 
providing more loans and increasing the home buying population.  
 
For over three decades,  the two GSEs increasingly dominated the U.S. mortgage 
market, reaching a major penetration by 2003 of over 50 percent of all U.S. single -
family mortgages and close to 100 percent of all prime,  conforming, mortgages.   
After the economic crisis of 2008, the Federal Housing Financing Agency placed 
the GSE’s into conservatorship and provided substantial financial support . The 
FHFA also undertook broad authority over the GSE’s but do not manage ever y 
aspect of their operations.  
 
Figure 1-1 depicts the growth of Freddie and Fannie. The left -hand side provides 
the total dollar value of Fann ie and Freddie’s commitments to the mortgage 
market through their portfolios and their net MBS  issuances, while the right hand 
side represents their share of the mortgage market.  
 
Figure 1-1: Growth of GSEs from 1980 –  2009.  
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2.0 Literature Review 
The number of low income families in the United States has steadily been growing 
over the years.  At the same time, the income gap between the low -income working 
families and the nation’s wealthiest have been widening. Homeownership  rates 
among lower-income and minority populations in the United States regularly lags 
that for the population at large. For example, the overall  home-ownership rate in 
2003 was 68.3 percent, but only 51.8 percent for lower -income families and about 
45 percent for minorities (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,  
2005b).  
These gaps have drawn the attention of policy makers, and were a major impetus 
for the passage of the GSE Act and the establishment of the affordable housing 
goals. Under their respective charters, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSE’s) are 
vested with unique and government originated competitive advantages worth $8 -
$10 billion a year.  With this money, the GSE’s are expected to extend the frontiers 
of affordable housing and facil itate the  flow of capital at  the margins including 
the following public purposes  
a)  Providing secondary market assistance relating to mortgages to low and 
middle income families  
b)  Ensuring stability and liquidity in the secondary mortgage market.  
c)  Promoting access to mortgage credit  throughout the nation especially in 
underdeveloped areas.  
d)  Responding appropriately to private capital market.  
In order to oversee the goals of the GSE affordable housing performance, 
Congress has granted supervisory authority to HUD which sets  affordable housing 
goals.  HUD is charged with specifying GSE purchase percentage requirements for 
each category and adjusting the percentage periodically,  as market conditions 
shift . HUD established the first set  of affordable housing goals in 1995 and th ese 
have evolved over time. Between 2001 and 2003, the HUD established certain 
goals for the GSE namely: 
7 
 
a)  Low and moderate income goal: At least 50% of the dwelling units financed 
by each of the GSE’s mortgage plan should be for families with median 
incomes not greater than the area median income  
b)  Underserved areas goal: At least  31% of the dwelling units financed by each 
GSE’s mortgage units should be for units located in the underserved areas.  
c)  Special Affordable goal: At least  20% of the dwelling units financed by 
each of GSE’s mortgage plan should be for very low income families.  
Research has found that  both the GSEs have responded positively to the affordable 
housing goals. For example, Bunce and Scheessele (1996),  Bunce (200 2) and 
Manchester (1998) prove that GSE’s increased the proportion of their loan 
purchases to targeted populations. The reached this within a few years after the 
enactment of the GSE act.  Additionally,  Listokin and Wyly (2000) and Temkin, 
et al. (2001) show that the GSEs enhanced their product offerings and facil itated 
more purchases of loans from targeted communities. These new products allow ed 
for higher risks  and departed from the industry norms in terms of their 
underwriting criteria.  Harrison, et al. (2002) shows that  GSEs can help lower-
income and minority communities by reducing information externalities and 
increasing transactions in thin markets.  However,  research has also found that the 
GSEs have not played a leading role in serving lower-income and minority 
populations. For example, Bunce and Scheessele (1996) find that  the “shares of 
the GSEs’ business reaching lower income borrowers and underserved 
neighborhoods typically fall short of the corresponding s hares of other market 
participants”(page 3 ). Other researchers, including Manches ter, et al . (1998) and 
Case, et  al.  (2002) arrive at  similar conclusions.  While these studies focused on 
GSE activities directly,  there are another set  of studies that focused on market 
outcomes associated with the increased GSE purchases in response to the 
affordable housing goals. Freeman and Gal ster (2004) studied underserved 
neighborhoods in Cleveland from 1993 to 1999 . They examined if GSE activity 
causes any changes in single family home sales volumes and price s. They find no 
links between secondary market activities,  by the GSEs or others,  and sales prices.  
Additionally,  they do find some evidence indicating that  secondary market 
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activities are associated with some increases in sales volumes . However on 
studying further,  they realise that  GSE purchase activities do not drive this 
relationship.  
Bostic and Gabriel (2004) empirically evaluates changes in various 
homeownership features such homeownership  rate, vacancy rate, and median 
house value among GSE-targeted census tracts relative to changes in a control  
group of similar tracts. They find limit ed direct effects of affordable housing goal 
incentives on local housing market outcomes in California during the 1990s. 
Ambrose and Thibodeau (2004) analyze another dimension of market  outcomes –  
the credit supply. They built  a credit supply-demand system and estimated their 
model based on historical data on mortgage lending and other economic and 
demographic variables.  Based on this system  they concluded that the affordable 
housing goals had a limited effect on the overall supply of mortgage credit to  
targeted groups in the largest 308  metropolitan statist ical areas during 1995 and 
1999. Therefore the existing studies suggest a paradox. On one hand, GSEs 
increased their purchase activit ies to targeted groups under the afforda ble housing 
goals, which should result  in increased access to credit and improved housin g 
market outcomes. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that these positive 
market outcomes did not occur. This research argues that  market dynamics 
between GSE activities and those of the FHA might help to explain the seemingly 
paradoxical findings. Created under the National Housing Act of 1934, FHA 
provides mortgage insurance mainly to those borrowers who do not have sufficient 
down payment or have higher debt-to-income ratios as represented by their credit  
scores. Essentially, the federal government insures loans for FHA approved 
lenders in order to reduce their risk of loss if  a bo rrower defaults on their 
mortgage payments. Typically an FHA loan is one of the easiest loans to qualify 
for because it requires a very low down payment and one can have less than perfect  
credit. A FHA down payments of just 3.5% is required as opposed to a  traditional 
loan that requires a down payment of roughly 20%.  FHA loans are therefore 
generally more costly than conventional loans (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991; 
Hendershott , Lafayette and Haurin, 1997; Ambrose, Pennington -Cross and Yezer,  
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2002).  Nonetheless, research indicates that conventional and FHA loan produ cts 
compete for many borrowers, particularly those with marginal credit quality 
(Ambrose, et al .,  2002; Bradford , 2002; Nothaft and Trentcheva, 2003; Abt,  
2004).  Given that  GSEs generally do not p urchase FHA loans,  our intuition is that  
intensified GSE purchases targeting underserved populations und er the affordable 
housing goals have a feedback effect  on FHA. Given this aggressive GSE pursuit  
primarily with the intent to increase profits induces potential  FHA borrowers with 
the best credit  quali ty to use the conventional market and obtain conforming 
conventional loans instead.  The FHA in order to retain its risk levels, undertakes 
higher underwriting standards and consequently ends up reducing i ts loan volume.  
This feedback effect offsets the increase in credit supply associated with the GSE 
purchases and limits changes in housing market outcomes. There are a few 
empirical studies which analyze the d ynamic relationship between FHA and 
conventional lending (or private mortgage insuran ce, PMI). For example, 
Ambrose,Pennington-Cross and Yezer (2002) find that,  as economic uncertainty 
increases, FHA market share increases and conventional market share decreases.  
Nothaft and Trentcheva (2003) find that  the FHA loan l imit increase both  expands 
the lending market and “crowds” out some conventional activity.  There has also 
been no studies that capture the effect of this aggressive GSE increase on the FHA 
delinquency rates. The paper below tries to formally model the relationship 
between increase GSE activity and FHA feedback and its  delinquency rates.   
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3.0 Data 
 
This research uses two main data sources to build the relationship between GSE 
activities, FHA feedback and FHA foreclosures; the data segment will be broken 
into two sections: the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)  as the primary 
data source and Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA).  This section aims to 
explain the sample data in detail and explain the analysis process.  
 
3.1 HMDA  
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) was enacted in 1975 and 
implemented through Regulation C, on July 21, 2011.  The HMDA provides the 
most comprehensive mortgage- related dataset in terms of coverage. It contains 
loan level mortgage application and origination information, including borrowers’ 
demographic traits , l ike age, race and income, loan type, loan amount,  l ocation of 
property,  origination status and certain institutional variables all over the nation. 
The HMDA has two main purposes within the mortgage industry.  The first  purpose 
of HMDA is to provide public information on housing data, financial institutions ,  
and lending patterns within geographic regions. This data is collected by the 
government to ensure that financial insti tutions are meeting the needs of all US 
citizens (regardless of where they preside) in order to reduce discriminatory 
lending (Gupta et  al . 2010).  The second purpose of the HMDA, is to aid the 
government in targeting private and public investment to areas of the country 
requiring government support;  this increases the efficiency of the federal 
governments tax spending. The HMDA resources are collected and maintained on 
an annual basis by the Federal  Financial Institutions Examination Council  
(FFIEC) and this information is released electronically and can be viewed 
publically (“HMDA Data” 2014 ).  
 
Our analysis is restricted to  the loan originations across 50  states and D.C 
characterized by loan type (GSE/Conventional and  FHA). By limiting the search 
parameters on the HMDA database to cover loans granted for the purpose of home 
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purchase, refinance and home improvement, the research looks at the percentages 
of conventional loans  and FHA loans to total  loan originations.  We wrote a code 
in Python to access and mine relevant data from HMDA.. For both years 2005 and 
2006, we searched for the aggregate report for each state. These st ates are broken 
down by Metropolitan State Area (MSA). For each of these MSA’s for each state,  
table A1 (Loan Sale by Loan type 1 to 4 families) gives us information on the 
loan application (it could be for home purchase,  refinance or home improvement)  
and the number of loans against each loan type( Conventional,  
FHA,VA,FSA/RHS). By adding up all the information for each of these MSA’s, 
we calculated the number of the conventional and FHA loans for each state. The 
python code we have automates the entire pr ocess to capture the details .  Using 
the above data  for the years 2005 and 2006, FHA and GSE loans as a percentage 
of the total loans were calculated for both years. The percentage change in these 
FHA and GSE loan originations (as a percentage of total loan s) for these two years 
were then determined.  
Confining our dataset to loans originated within 2005 -06 we will be able to build 
a clear relationship  excluding the biases due to  the economic or environmental 
factors surrounding the US housing market crisis  in 2007. We examine the loan 
originations for each type of loan which were  broken down into state -level detail 
to illustrate the trends in GSE activity and its impact on FHA feedback in diverse 
geographic regions across the country.  Analysing the percentage change in loan 
originations from 2005 to 2006 for both the GSE (conventional) and FHA loans,  
uncovered interesting insights about the GSE activities prior to the period of 
crisis.   The dollar amounts of loans were not used because of their relative 
complexity and inability to add clarity to this research.  
 
 
3.2 Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA)  
The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is the national association representing 
the entire real estate finance industry.  
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The National Delinquency Survey (NDS) is one of the most recognized sources 
for residential mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates. Based on a sample of 
approximately 41.6 million mortgage loans serviced by mortgage companies, 
commercial  banks, thrifts,  credit  unions and others, NDS provid es quarterly 
delinquency and foreclosure statistics at  the national, regional and state levels.  
Delinquency and foreclosure measures are broken out into loan type (prime, 
subprime, VA and FHA) and fixed and adjustable rate products. At each 
geographic classification, there are 7 measures :  total delinquencies,  del inquency 
by past due category (20 –  59 days, 60 -89 days and 90 days and over), new 
foreclosures, foreclosure inventory and seriously delinquent. The total number of 
loans serviced each quarter, as compiled through the survey, is also included in 
the data.  We used the NDS quarterly reports to get  information on the FHA 
delinquent loans. The seriously delinquent loans were the number of FHA 
delinquent loans whose installments were past due 90 days or more plus the 
number of loans that  were in foreclosure at the end of the quarter.  We analysed 
data for the years 2008 and 2009 as we intend to study the relationship between 
the changes in the GSE loan originations before the crisis on the FHA loan 
delinquency rates after the crisis. Also, we kept such a gap between the 
origination activity and the delinquency rates as we believe that the most 
mortgages take at least a year before defaul t.  
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4.0 Methodology 
 
GSE’s exist to serve the American Housing market and both Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are national mortgage finance companies but they do not offer home 
loans. They stand behind mortgage lenders, which include national banks, thrifts,  
credit unions and other financial institutions in all the states in the USA. The 
GSE’s purchase the mortgage loans that these financial  instituti ons originate 
thereby replenishing the funds for these institutions. These mortgage lenders can 
then use these extra funds to again lend out to other homeowners and apartment 
owners.  By 2003, the GSE’s achieved a target share of over 50% of single family 
mortgages and close to 100% of prime mortgages.   
FHA’s on the other hand do not purchase mortgages nor act a mortgage lenders 
but insure loans given out by FHA approved lenders to certain target groups.  
These groups have primarily been the lower i ncome, minority population and 
individuals with low credit scores.  
Both the GSE’s and the FHA’s have one goal th at is to increase homeownership 
rates in the USA although they have different means to achieve this(As described 
above) and even different target populations.  Ideally we should not expect any 
relationship to exist between these enti ties ,  however if  there is one, it  will be a 
surprise.  
With the GSE expansion, banks have more funds and now can extend loans to 
even individuals with lower credit  scores. This eats into the FHA market share 
and hence we believe that an expansion of GSE activit y pushes the FHA into 
marginal borrowers. We think that this might cause the FHA delinquency rates to 
increase and hence test  for a relationship between an increased GSE activity and 
FHA delinquency rates.  
For an analysis on the relationship between the im pacts described above, we use 
the below two methods:  
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4.1 OLS Regression Analysis  
We test for the relationship between an increased GSE activity on FHA feedback  
in two ways.  
First  we compare the state level trends in GSE and FHA market  shares between 
2005 and 2006 (pre-crisis period).  Second to more accurately characterize the 
relationship between GSE and FHA activit ies, we use OLS regression. Regression 
analysis predicted a relationship between a selected variable (% change in FHA 
activity) and an observed outcome (% change in GSE share); it  is  essentially a 
line of best fit  between two variables (Hoy, Livernois, McKenna, Rees, and 
Stengos 2001). Using linear regression in the ordinary least  squares (OLS) model,  
we can create a robust formula that  can fi t our real -word data.  
 
(1)  ΔFi =α +ηΔGi  
 
Here ΔFi is  the change of market share of FHA between  period t1 and t2, ΔGi is  
the change of GSE market share during the same period. If  we expect a 
relationship to exist,  it  would be interesting to test if the increased GSE activity 
results in a higher liquidity in the residential markets or does it only take away 
from the FHA market share.  We estimate α and η  by performing the  OLS 
regression. We estimate this regression to test if   
The linear regression function we have used in an inbuilt  MATLAB function 
‘Regstats’ .  Alternatively,  we have also used the regression analysis tool from the 
Data analysis toolbox in Excel.  Another important aspect of the linear regression 
formula is its ability to provide a precise best -fit  line with very few data inputs; 
however,  the more data points utilized, the more convincing the research becomes 
because its degrees of freedom increases.  
 
On an average, in a given year about 96% of the loans were sold to GSEs and only 
4 % of the loans were involving the FHA. In moving from 2005 –  2006 for all the 
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states that  increased the  GSE activity had their FHA share cont racted. These 
findings are consistent with our theoretical model.  
 
Next we test the relationship between the GSE activity and FHA delinquency rates  
in the following year. We estimate the same OLS regression except that our 
dependent variable now is the FHA delinquency rates for 2009.  
 
4.2 Statistic test  
 
The two-sample t -test with unequal sample size and variance was used, with a 
95% confidence level rather of a one -tail  test because we wanted to capture the 
variance on both sides of the coefficient error term (standard deviation) to get a 
complete picture of the relationships statistical significance. The  t-statistic was 
utilized over the P-value approach because we can analyse one value instead of 
providing a range of values.  
 
       (2) 
Where 
Here, s2 is the unbiased estimator of the variance of the 
two samples.  The paper utilizes a two-tail t-test on each coefficients standard 
error term in order to determine which terms are significant for our research. The 
t-stat calculated above is compared to the critical  two- tail t -value of 2.009575 
(using 49 degrees of freedom) to determine the level of sign ificance of the error  
term with 95% confidence. One drawback of statistical tests like the t -test, is that 
it  relies heavily on unrealistic assumptions and other unknown characteristics of 
your data set;  the test choice is susceptible to human error (Vogelvang  2005).  
 
16 
 
The inbuil t MATLAB function ttest2(x,y)  returns a test decision for the null  
hypothesis that the data in vectors  x and y comes from independent random 
samples from normal distributions with equal means and equal but unknown 
variances, using the  two-sample t-test . The alternative hypothesis is  that the data 
in x and y comes from populations with unequal means. The result  h is 1 if the 
test  rejects the null hypothesis at the  5% significance level, and 0 otherwise.  
We divided the percentage change in GSE loan originations for 2005 and 2006 
into two buckets.  One bucket consisted of states that  increased its  GSE activity 
and the other bucket consisted of states that  decreased it s  GSE activity from 2005 
to 2006. For each of these buckets we use  the corresponding FHA delinquency 
rates and run a t -test  to compare the means of the FHA delinquency rates for the 
states that saw an increase in GSE activity vs those that saw a decrease i n GSE 
activity.  The null  hypothesis is  our initial assumption which is “An increase in 
GSE activity increases the FHA delinquency rates by pushing the FHA into more 
marginal borrowers”.   
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5.0 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
 
This paper has used linear regression relationship,  however, two limitations 
occurred during the data collection phase. Limitations on delinquency data caused 
the research to be less rigorous than originally intended. The lack of a thorough 
study creates scope further research in the field.   
 
The first  limitation was related to the delinquency rates for FHA loans which were 
broken down only on the state level. HMDA provides the loan information at the 
MSA/county level which is a preferred geographic line as  opposed to states.  To 
have data consistency, we were limited to using the loan originations at  the state 
level.  The second limitation also lies within the Mortgage Bankers Association’s 
National Delinquency Survey. We reached out to the MBAA based out of 
Washington DC to obtain 2008- 09 delinquency reports which provide the 
delinquency rates broken down at  the state level which was based on a fee. We 
were able to research and find National Delinquency Survey reports for 5 quarters,  
Q2 2008, Q4 2008, Q1 2009, Q3 2009 and Q4 2009, these were publically 
available on the internet. We believe the gap due to a missing quarter in 2009 
could be a drawback in this research. Other researchers with access to appropriate 
data could overcome this approximation bias and the errors it  might have 
embedded in it.   
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6.0 Empirical Results  
 
Empirical  evidence from implementation of the affordable housing goals which 
were designed to increase GSE presence in tran sactions involving lower-income 
and minority populations in order to improve access to credit and homeownership 
suggests a puzzle. On one hand, substantial evidence shows that the GSEs have 
responded positively to the affordable housing goals by allocating more of their 
purchases to the targeted groups defined by t he goals. On the other hand, recent 
research finds limited improvement for these neighborhoods in terms of credit  
supply, home sale volumes and prices, homeownership,  and other housing market 
outcomes. Also the increase in GSE activity in pursuit of high c reditworthy 
borrowers which in turn pushed the FHA into more marginal borrowers does not 
seem to a factor influencing the FHA delinquency rates in the following year .  
 
 
6.1 Relationship between GSE activity and FHA feedback . 
Using our model of credit rationing as described in the theoretical model sect ion 
our null hypothesis is,  “The GSE market share in targeted areas should increase 
after the implementation of the  goals and this increase should cause th e market 
share of FHA to shrink”  We tested for this relationship using a regression analysis 
with the percentage change in GSE loans from 2005 to 2006 as the independent 
variable and the percentage change in FHA loans from 2005 to  2006 as the 
dependent variable.  Refer to appendix 8.1.1 for results.  
The regression equation that  we have obtained is  
(3)  Y= -13.85X+0.0105 
t -s ta t      ( -5 .7638)   (0 .3925)  
Which indicates a negative relation between the change in GSE loans and FHA 
feedback. Given that  our p value here is  .6964 which is >0.05 we fail  to reject  
the null  hypothesis that  “The GSE market share in targeted areas should increase 
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after the implementation of the  goals and this increase should cause the market 
share of FHA to shrink”  .   The tstat for the intercept term is 0.3925 while the 
tstat  for the slope is -5.7638 which confirms the strong negative relationship 
between these variables.  As the tstat value is  lesser than the t  cri tical  value,  we 
fail to reject the null  hypothesis.  Further the R square value is  0.404 which 
implies that  our regression explains 40% of the variation between GSE and FHA 
activities which is very strong.  
.  
 
6.2 GSE activity prior to crisis and FHA delinquency post crisis.  
We attempt to provide innovative extension to the results of An Bostic’s papers 
to check whether an increase in GSE activity prior to the crisis affects the FHA 
delinquency rates post the crisis .  This question stems from the fact that the GSEs 
took away the high creditworthy borrowers from the FHA which then started 
lending to marginal borrowers as a result  of stricter underwrit ing standards.  Our 
null hypothesis in this case is our initial assumption whic h is “As GSE activity 
increases,  FHA delinquency rates increase”  Refer to appendix 8.1.2 for results.  
The regression equation we have obtained is  
(4)  Y = -0.0562X + 0.0794 
t -s ta t      ( -0 .1504)   (19 .1126)  
 
The p value that  we have obtained for this regression is 2.33E -24 which is much 
smaller than 0.05 and hence statistical ly significant. Given this,  we reject our null  
hypothesis.  Also, the absolute value for tstat  for the intercept term is  19.1126 
which is greater than 0.05 and confirms with our results obtained with the 
significant p value. We reject the null hypothesis.  The coefficient  show a small 
negative slope of -0.0562 which is also in - conclusive of any relationship between 
these two variables.  The R square value is 4.61E-04 which means that  our 
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regression only explains 0.000461% of the variation between these two va riables 
which is statistically insignificant.  
In order to further confirm any relationship we ran a t -test  on data. The null  
hypothesis for the ttest on the bucketed data for FHA delinquency rates is “ The 
FHA delinquency rates are the same for states that saw an increase in GSE activity 
and states that saw a decrease in GSE activity.”   As seen in appendix 8.1.2 we 
notice that  the means for the two buckets (FHA delinquency rates for states that 
increased GSE and states that  decreased GSE) are the same. This is proved by the 
P value for the two tail test which equals 0.12784 which is greater than 0.05 and 
hence statist ically insignificant.  Also, the t-stat value of 1.5500 is lesser than the 
t critical two tail value of 2.011 and greater than the critical  value  of -2.011.  
The ttest  fails to reject  the null hypothesis which means that an increase in GSE 
activity prior to the crisis does not appear to increase the delinquency rates for 
the FHA loans after the crisis.  We also report the mean values for positive and  
negative buckets of data. The means of FHA delinquency rates for positive GSE 
activity and negative GSE activity show a very small  change ( -0.0122) and is not 
statistically significant.  
 
 
6.3 Does winsorizing the data help reduce the impact of outliers?  
Data Mining  –  We suspect the inadequacy of GSE activity in explaining the FHA 
delinquency rates might be due to the influence of possibly spurious outliers. We 
considered data mining techniques such as trimming or truncation but winsorizing 
seemed an attractive method to reduce the impact of the outliers.  While data 
trimming reduces the impact of outliers by excluding them, winsorizing is reduces 
the impact of outliers in a statistically more robust way (Leon, Mesa, Wasley 
2013)Post Winsorizing –  We simulate a few different combinations of winsorizing 
the data for 50 states and D.C. for % change in proportion of GSE loans vs the 
FHA delinquency rates.  From the scatter plot of the winsorized data, we notice 
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that  the major outl iers have reduced.  Following the similar statist ical  analysis,  
we run the same regression test  again to test whether the statistical variables show 
any improvement.  We notice that the t stat  value for the intercept term has 
increased to 21.9913 which is greater than the t cri tical  value o f 2.009 and the p 
values for both slope and intercept are smaller than 0.05 and hence statist ically 
significant.  Given this, even after winsorizing our data,  we have to again reject 
the null  which is “As GSE activity increases,  FHA delinquency rates increa se”  
This regression has an R square value of 1.69E -04 which means only a very small  
portion of the relation between these variables is explained by the regression.  We 
also ran the t -test  on the two buckets as described in the sections above to check 
for the any difference in the means. The p value obtained in such a test is 0.1125 
which is statistically insignificant. Also, the t -stat  value of 1.6166 is lesser than 
the t-critical  value of 2.010 and greater than -2.010, which theoretically proves  
that  there is no difference between the means.  
From both pre-winsorising and post –  winsorizing the tstat  value is  However, 
since our sample size is pretty small , obtaining a value of tstat greater than 1 
might mean there is a relationship between the two variables  which might be a 
good surprise for the  Refer to appendix 8.1.3 for results  
6.4 Effect of additional  explanatory variables  
Given our small  sample size,  we need to incorporate additional explanatory 
variables to build a more robust  model for testing a relationship between the GSE 
activity and the FHA delinquency rates. We added four variables to the regression 
Unemployment rate in 2009,  change in Unemployment rate (2008 to 2009), change 
in GDP (2008 to 2009) and Change in House Price Index (2008 to 2009). A brief  
description of these variables are provided below-  
Unemployment rate in 2009: The unemployment rate is a measure of the 
prevalence of unemployment and it is  calculated as a percentage by dividing the 
number of unemployed individuals by all  the individuals currently in the labor 
force. When a consumer borrows money to make a large purchase,  his abil ity to 
repay his loan and or the interests in dependent on his ability to remain employed . 
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Change in Unemployment rate: A decrease in unemployment indicates a 
prospering economy and subsequently indi cates the abili ty to repay loan premiums 
and interests .  
Change in GDP: GDP or Gross Domestic Profit is an aggregate measure of 
production equal to the sum of all gross values added of all resident institutional 
units engaged in production . An increase in GDP indicates a prospering economy 
Change in House Price Index: House Price Index is a broad measure of the 
movement of single family house prices in the U.S. This index serves as an 
indicator for house price trends and it also works as a tool to estimate c hanges in  
mortgage rate defaults, prepayments and housing affordability.  
The regression equation we have obtained from the multiple regression analysis 
is as below 
(5)Y = 0.0062615-0.26398*%change in GSE+0.508*Unemployment rate in 
2009+1.007*Change in Unemployment –  0.3013*Change in GDP + 0.0918*HPI 
change 
As from the equation 5 above, the percentage change in GSE has a negative 
relationship with the FHA delinquency rates.  Unemployment rates in 2009 have a 
positive relationship with the FHA delinquency rat es, change in unemployment 
rates have a positive relationship,  Change in GDP has a negative relationship and 
the change in House Price Index has a positive relationship with FHA delinquency 
rates in 2009. All  this is indicated by the sign of the coefficien ts in the regression 
equation above. Please refer to Appendix 8.1.4 for all details  
The adjusted R square value is  46.74% and this means that  all  the above 
explanatory variables explain about 47% of the variation in the FHA delinquency 
rates and is a pretty high value.  
The regression model is  statistically significant for both 95 and 99% confidence 
intervals as given by the significance F value of 2.25413E -06. 
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The p value for percentage change in GSE is 0.34606 which is greater than 0.05 
and hence statistically insignificant. This indicates that  we cannot prove a 
negative relationship between the percentage change in GSE loans before the 
crisis and the FHA delinquency rates after the crisis.  
The p value for the unemployment rate in 2009 is 0.1023 which is gr eater than 
0.05 and hence statistically insignificant. This indicates that we cannot prove a 
positive relationship between the unemployment rate in 2009 and the FHA 
delinquency rates in 2009.  
The p value for the change in unemployment rate from 2008 to 2009 is 0.1130 
which is greater than 0.05 and hence statistically insignificant. This indicates that 
we cannot confirm a positive relationship between the  change in unemployment 
rate from 2008 to 2009 and the FHA delinquency rates in 2009 (as indicated by 
the coefficient)  
The p value for the change in GDP from 2008 to 2009 is 0.0070 which is lesser 
than 0.05 and hence statistically significant. This test indicates that we can 
confirm a negative relationship between the change in GDP from 2008 to 2009 
and the FHA delinquency rates in 2009(as indicated by the coefficient).  However,  
more tests would need to be done to confirm this relationship.  
The p value for the change in House Price Index from 2008 to 2009 is 0.2164 
which is greater than 0.05 and hence stati stically insignificant. This indicates that 
we cannot confirm a positive relationship between the change in HPI from 2008 
to 2009 and the FHA delinquency rates in 2009(as indicated by the coefficient)  
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7.0 Conclusions 
 
In this research paper, we tried to study and examine any relationship between 
GSE activity,  FHA feedback and FHA delinquency rates. Primarily,  we sought to 
answer the following questions:  
1) Is there a relationship between GSE activity and FHA feedback ? 
2) Did the GSE activity prior to t he crisis have any impact on the FHA 
delinquency rates for the period after the crisis ? 
Through our research and study we concluded the following about the relation 
between the two government sponsored housing loan programs:  
1)  There is a negative relation between GSE activity and FHA feedback. As 
GSE loans increase in proportion to the total loans, FHA loan originations 
decrease.  
2)  None of our statistical  tests could indicate that an increase in GSE activity 
prior to the economic crisis result ed in an increase in FHA loan delinquency 
rates.  
 
 
 
7.1 Is there a relationship between GSE activity and FHA feedback?  
Yes.  
Our empirical analysis of changes of market shares of FHA and GSE supports the 
theoretical hypothesis of a feedback loop between GSE purchases and FHA 
activities. There is a significant negative relationship between the change in GSE 
and FHA market shares,  which is consistent with the view that more aggressive 
GSE purchases in “underserved neighborhoods” result in a significant feedback 
on FHA activities. We conclude that the GSE gain could have come at the expense 
of other market participants .  
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Our regression results as shown above replicate the basic result of Rafael and An 
Bostic’s paper that  as the GSE loan originations increase,  the FHA loan 
originations decrease.  As with the intuit ion stated in the paper,  we believe that as 
GSE starts expanding into more market segments in order to increase profits , they 
target what would have been the higher quality loans for FHA segments.  Now the 
FHA in order to maintain its lending standards and an appropriate risk appeti te 
adopt stricter underwrit ing standards and h ence do not offer loans to individuals 
who do not meet this cri teria.  As a result  of this  increased GSE loan activity,  FHA 
loan originations reduce. 
 
7.2  Did the GSE activity prior to the crisis have any impact on the FHA 
delinquency rates for the period after the crisis?  
No. 
As discussed in the 1 s t  conclusion above, as the proportion of GSE loans to total  
loans increase, FHA loan activity decreases. We further investigate the data to 
check whether an increase in GSE loan activity has an effect on the FHA  loan 
delinquency rates in the following year.  We ran  a regression test  with the change 
in the proportion of GSE loans to the total  loans (from 2005 to 2006) as the 
independent variable and the FHA delinquency rates as the dependent variable .  
Since the regression provided no significant results  between the two variables 
(please refer to section 6.2 above),  we changed our statistical  approach and used 
the t-test methodology to verify any other possibility.  We checked for a difference 
in the means between the FHA delinquency rates for states that  increased GSE 
and for states that  decreased its GSE activity.  Our result as described in section 
6.2 proved that there is  no difference in the means thereby confirming that  an 
increased GSE Activity has no effect on FHA delinquency rates.  
 
We believe that  the increase in GSE activity in pursuit  of high creditworthy 
borrowers pushed the FHA into more marginal borrowers .  Given that GSEs 
generally do not purchase FHA loans, our intuition (also proved above)  is  that  
intensified GSE purchases created a feedback effect on FHA. Given this 
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aggressive GSE pursuit , primarily with the intent to increase profits , induces 
potential FHA borrowers with the best credit quality to use the conventional 
market and obtain conforming conventional loans instead.  The FHA in turn, in 
order to retain its  risk levels,  undertakes stricter  underwrit ing standards and 
consequently ends up reducing its loan volume.  These two response factors 
namely, reduced FHA loans and stricter underwriting ensures that FHA retains 
its loan quality and thereby ensues no increased delinquency rates .  However, 
these reactions offset the increase in credit supply associated with the GSE 
purchases and limits changes in housing market outcomes . 
 
In conclusion, regardless of the outcome of the vario us debates about the 
affordable housing goals policy, one thing is clear.  Homeownership  is  important. 
Given this fact,  policy-makers should continue searching for new instr uments to 
help lower-income and minority households gain access to credit and 
homeownership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.0 Appendix  
8.1 Empirical results  
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8.1.1. % change in proportion of GSE loan originations Vs % change in change in proportion of FHA loan 
  
 
Descrip tion:  Rela tionsh ip between % change in  GSE loan  or igina tions Vs % change in  FHA 
loan or igina tions  (dependant variab le)  on  a s ta te  leve l .  We found that  as the GSE ac tiv i ty  
increases the FHA loan orig inat ions reduce ,  concluding a  s t rong inverse  re lat ion be tween 
the two  variab les.  The t sta t  ind ica tes tha t  bo th standard error coef f ic ients terms are 
sign if ican t  at  95% conf idence;  conclud ing that  this  relat ionship i s  sign if icant .  Each po int  
represen ts one o f  the 5 0  sta tes  and D.C.  in  the US.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1.2 Percentage change in proportion of GSE loan originations Vs FHA delinquency rates. 
y = -13.85x + 0.0105
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Change in GSE loans as percentage of total loans
Change in GSE vs. Change in FHA (2005 to 2006)
Multiple R 0.64
R Square 0.40
Adj. R Square 0.39
Standard Error 0.04
Observations 51
Regression Statistics
Coefficients Standard Error t stat p value 
Intercept 1.05E-02 2.67E-02 0.39 0.70
GSE -13.85 2.40 -5.76 5.40E-07
t critical (two tail) 2.00975
Statistical Significance Statstics
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Descrip tion:  Re lat ionsh ip between % c hange in  GSE loan or igina tions Vs % FHA loan 
delinquency  rates  (dependant var iable)  on a state  leve l .  We found tha t  as the GSE ac tivi ty  
increases the FHA del inquency rates do no t  change ,  concluding no re la tion be tween the two 
variables.  The t sta t  for  regression  ind icates tha t  both  standard error  coeff ic ients  terms are 
ins igni f icant  a t  95% confidence;  the ts tat  in  the t - test  i s  lesser than the t  cr i t ica l  value and  
hence cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis that  the means  of  the  two  variables are the same;  
conclud ing tha t  th ere is  no impact  o f  increased GSE activi ty  on FHA delinquency rates in  the  
fol lowing year .  Each  po int  represen ts one o f  the  5 0 s tates  and  D.C.  in  the US.  
y = -0.0562x + 0.0794
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FHA delinquency rates (2008-09) Vs % change in GSE loan originations (2005 to 2006)
Multiple R 0.02
R Square 0.00
Adj. R Square -0.02
Standard Error 0.00
Observations 51
Regression Statistics
Coefficients Standard Error t stat p value 
Intercept 7.94E-02 4.20E-03 1.91E+01 2.33E-24
GSE -5.62E-02 3.73E-01 -1.50E-01 8.81E-01
t critical (two tail) 2.00975
Statistical Significance Statstics
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
FHA delinquencies 
for positive change 
in GSE loans(2005-
2006)
FHA delinquencies 
for negative change in 
GSE loans(2005-
2006)
Mean 0.08 0.07
Variance 0.00 0.00
Observations 28.00 23.00
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00
df 47.00
t Stat 1.55
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.06
t Critical one-tail 1.68
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.13
t Critical two-tail 2.01
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8.1.3 Effect of 95% winsorization
 
 
Descrip tion:  Winsoriz ing at  95% the  % change  in  GSE loan  or igina tions  and  % FHA loan  
delinquency  rates  (dependant var iable)  on a sta te  leve l .  We found tha t  even af ter at tempting  
to  reduce  the  in f luence o f  the  out l iers,  as the GSE act iv i ty  increases the FHA  delinquency  ra tes  
do not  change ,  conclud ing no rela tion between the two variab les.  The t s tat  indicates that  bo th 
standard error coef f icients terms are insign if icant  at  95% confidence;  the ts tat  in  the t - tes t  i s  
lesser  than the  t  cri t ica l  value and  hence we cannot re jec t  the  nul l  hypothesis  tha t  the  means 
of  the two variables are the same  conclud ing tha t  th ere is  no impact  of  increased GSE activi ty  
on FHA del inquency rates  in  the fol lowing  year.  Each po int  represen ts  one of  the  50 sta tes  and  
D.C.  in  the  US.  
y = -0.0217x + 0.0789
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% change in GSE loans from 2005- 06
FHA delinquency rates (2008-09) Vs % change in GSE loan 
originations (2005 to 2006)
Multiple R 0.01
R Square 5.49E-05
Adj. R Square -0.02
Standard Error 7.74E-04
Observations 51
Regression Statistics
Coefficients Standard Error t stat p value 
Intercept 7.84E-02 3.60E-03 21.99 4.87E-27
GSE 0.04 0.45 0.09 9.28E-01
t critical (two tail) 2.00975
Statistical Significance Statstics
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Winsorized data
FHA delinquencies 
for positive 
change in GSE 
loans(2005-2006)
FHA delinquencies 
for negative change 
in GSE loans(2005-
2006)
Mean 0.08 0.07
Variance 0.00 0.00
Observations 28 23
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 48
t Stat 1.62
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.11
t Critical two-tail 2.01
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8.1.4 Effect of change in GSE, unemployment rate in 2009, change in unemployment rates, change in GDP 
and HPI change on FHA delinquency rates (2009) 
 
 
 
Descrip tion:  Rela tionsh ip between % change in  GSE, unemployment ra te in  2009,  Change in  
Unemployment f rom 2008 to  2009. ,  Change in  GDP  from 2008 to  2009  and change in  HPI  f rom 
2008 to  2009  on  FHA delinquency ra tes (dependant variab le)  for 2008,2009 .  The signs o f  the  
coef f ic ien ts provide for  the d irec tion  of  the  relat ionship.  However,  we  f ind tha t  the on ly  
sta t i st ica lly  sign if icant  re lat ionship is  for the change in  GDP which has a  p  va lue o f  
0 .007017(lesser than  0.05 ).  Al l  o ther  p  values are grea ter than 0.05 and hence s tat is t ical ly  
ins igni f icant .  Each po in t  represents  one of  the  50 sta tes and D.C.  in  the US  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.72
R Square 0.52
Adjusted R Square 0.47
Standard Error 0.02
Observations 51
Statistical Significance Statistics
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.66
%change in GSE -0.26 0.28 -0.95 0.35
Unemp -2009 0.51 0.31 1.67 0.10
Change in unemp. 1.01 0.62 1.62 0.11
Change in GDP -0.30 0.11 -2.83 0.01
HPI change 0.09 0.07 1.25 0.22
t-critical (two tail) 2.00975
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 0.02 0.00 9.78 0.00
Residual 45 0.02 0.00
Total 50 0.04
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8.2 Data 
8.2.1 FHA Delinquency data broken down at the state level.
  
8.2.2 HMDA data 
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State Conventional FHA Total % GSE % FHA
Alabama 122470 7068 133345 0.918445 0.053005
Alaska 18200 1788 21979 0.828063 0.08135
Arizona 525157 6274 535123 0.981376 0.011724
Arkansas 116418 7916 127522 0.912925 0.062076
California 2313883 5051 2320447 0.997171 0.002177
Colarado 275004 13763 294303 0.934425 0.046765
Connecticut 162294 4907 167605 0.968312 0.029277
Delaware 48640 1157 50554 0.962139 0.022886
DistrictOfColumbia 375113 4109 380866 0.984895 0.010789
Florida 1235808 15084 1260459 0.980443 0.011967
Georgia 414058 22379 444701 0.931093 0.050324
Hawaii 39165 323 40017 0.978709 0.008072
Idaho 68963 3051 72910 0.945865 0.041846
Illinois 739623 21605 765915 0.965672 0.028208
Indiana 337495 21520 363121 0.929428 0.059264
Iowa 117609 3998 123455 0.952647 0.032384
Kansas 124864 5770 132279 0.943944 0.04362
Kentucky 229175 11474 246722 0.928879 0.046506
Louisiana 106937 4681 114066 0.937501 0.041038
Maine 42360 694 43506 0.973659 0.015952
Maryland 707613 10892 722154 0.979864 0.015083
Massachusetts 400201 3323 404110 0.990327 0.008223
Michigan 416695 14791 433649 0.960904 0.034108
Minnesota 239568 5493 246409 0.972237 0.022292
Mississippi 83291 5757 90973 0.915557 0.063283
Missouri 322518 13914 341069 0.945609 0.040795
Montana 12773 936 14194 0.899887 0.065943
Nebraska 53821 2697 57913 0.929342 0.04657
Nevada 235357 1835 238075 0.988583 0.007708
NewHampshire 48962 485 49648 0.986183 0.009769
NewJersey 732807 13110 747556 0.98027 0.017537
NewMexico 59622 3187 64492 0.924487 0.049417
NewYork 567841 12384 581902 0.975836 0.021282
NorthCarolina 386182 16275 416476 0.927261 0.039078
NorthDakota 14925 1136 16393 0.91045 0.069298
Ohio 418325 20305 442994 0.944313 0.045836
Oklahoma 90334 6650 100366 0.900046 0.066257
Oregon 204807 2775 209243 0.9788 0.013262
Pennsylvania 582365 14072 599413 0.971559 0.023476
PuertoRico 91712 4655 97123 0.944287 0.047929
RhodeIsland 95145 1278 96573 0.985213 0.013234
SouthCarolina 229739 9038 243865 0.942075 0.037061
SouthDakota 19236 909 20832 0.923387 0.043635
Tennessee 206938 12606 225385 0.918153 0.055931
Texas 693392 55604 768460 0.902314 0.072358
Utah 131024 9645 142313 0.920675 0.067773
Vermont 9629 89 9760 0.986578 0.009119
Virginia 613027 11911 633671 0.967422 0.018797
Washington 460479 7231 473436 0.972632 0.015273
WestVirginia 436485 5650 444706 0.981514 0.012705
Wisconsin 445913 9004 457427 0.974829 0.019684
Wyoming 8519 222 9148 0.931242 0.024268
Loan Originations in 2005
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